Structuralism as a Response to Skepticism

Cartesian arguments for global skepticism about the external world start from the premise that we cannot know that we are not in a Cartesian scenario such as an evil-demon scenario, and infer that because most of our empirical beliefs are false in such a scenario, these beliefs do not constitute knowledge. Veridicalist responses to global skepticism respond that arguments fail because in Cartesian scenarios, many or most of our empirical beliefs are true. Some veridicalist responses have been motivated using verificationism, externalism, and coherentism. I argue that a more powerful veridicalist response to global skepticism can be motivated by structuralism, on which physical entities are understood as those that play a certain structural role. I develop the structuralist response and address objections

The problem of consciousness

Este artículo ofrece una visión no técnica de los problemas de la consciencia y mi tratamiento de ellos. Distingo entre los problemas fáciles y el problema fuerte de la consciencia, y argumento que el problema fuerte elude  los métodos de explicación convencionales. Sostengo que se requiere una nueva forma de explicación no  reductiva y planteo algunos movimientos hacia una teoría detallada no reductiva.This paper gives a nontechnical overview of the problems of consciousness and my approach to them. In it I  distinguish between the easy problems and the hard problem of consciousness, and argue that the hard  problem eludes conventional methods of explanation. I argue that we need a new form of nonreductive  explanation, and make some moves toward a detailed nonreductive theory

Perception and the Fall from Eden

In the Garden of Eden, we had unmediated contact with the world. We were directly acquainted with objects in the world and with their properties. Objects were presented to us without causal mediation, and properties were revealed to us in their true intrinsic glory. When an apple in Eden looked red to us, the apple was gloriously, perfectly, and primitively red. There was no need for a long causal chain from the microphysics of the surface through air and brain to a contingently connected visual experience. Rather, the perfect redness of the apple was simply revealed to us. The qualitative redness in our experience derived entirely from the presentation of perfect redness in the world. Eden was a world of perfect color. But then there was a Fall. First, we ate from the Tree of Illusion. After this, objects sometimes seemed to have different colors and shapes at different times, even though there was reason to believe that the object itself had not changed. So the connection between visual experience and the world became contingent: we could no longer accept that visual experience always revealed the world exactly as it is. Second, we ate from the Tree of Science. After this, we found that when we see a

La mente extendida

Where does the mind stop and the rest of the world begin? The question invites two standard replies. some accept the intuitive demarcations of skin and skull, and say that what is outside the body is outsider the mind. Others are impressed by the arguments of Putnam and Burge that the truth-conditions of our thoughts “just ain’t in the head”,[* and hold that this externalism about meaning carries over into an externalism about mind. We propose to pursue a third position. We will advocate an externalism about mind, but one that is in no way grounded in the debatable role of truth-conditions and referente in fixing the contents of our mental states. rather, we advocate an active externalism, based on the active role of the environment in driving cognitive processes..¿Dónde acaba la mente y dónde empieza el resto del mundo?. La pregunta invita a dos respuestas típicas. Algunas personas aceptan las demarcaciones de la piel, y el cráneo, y afirman que lo que se halla fuera del cuerpo está también fuera de la mente. Otros sin embargo se inclinan por el argumento de que los significados de las palabras “simplemente no están en la cabeza” y sostienen este externalismo del significado, extendiéndolo a toda la mente. Nosotros queremos proponer una tercera posición. Abogamos por un tipo diferente de externalismo: un externalismo activo, basado en el papel activo que el entorno tiene en la consecución de los procesos cognitivosOú commence la pensée et oú le reste du monde? la question nous invite à deux réponses communes. Quelques uns acceptent les démarcations intuitives de la peau et le crâne, en affirmant que ce que on voit dehors du corps est aussi dehors de la pensée. Des autres sont frappés par les arguments de hillary Putnam et de Burge sur les conditions de vérité de notres pensées, que ne “sont pas dans la tête”, et soutiennent que cet externalisme du sens implique l’externalisme de la pensée. Nous proposons une troisième position, à faveur du externalisme de la pensée, mais pas fondé sur la discussion des conditions de vérité et de la rëference dans la fixation des états mentaux. Au fait nous proposons un externalisme actif, fondé dans le rôle actif du environnement dans la direction des procès cognitifs

Illusions of gunk

The possibility of gunk has been used to argue against mereological nihilism. This paper explores two responses on the part of the microphysical mereological nihilist: (1) the contingency defence, which maintains that nihilism is true of the actual world; but that at other worlds, composition occurs; (2) the impossibility defence, which maintains that nihilism is necessary true, and so gunk worlds are impossible. The former is argued to be ultimately unstable; the latter faces the explanatorily burden of explaining the illusion that gunk is possible. It is argued that we can discharge this burden by focussing on the contingency of the microphysicalist aspect of microphysical mereological nihilism. The upshot is that gunk-based arguments against microphysical mereological nihilism can be resisted